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Abstract
Opioid overdose mortality has been increasing rapidly in the U.S., with some
states experiencing much larger mortality growth than others. Legalizing medical
cannabis could reduce opioid-related mortality if potential opioid users substitute to-
wards cannabis as a safer alternative. I show, however, that a substantial reduction in
opioid-related mortality associated with the implementation of medical cannabis laws
can be explained by selection bias. States that legalized medical cannabis exhibit lower
pre-existing mortality trends. Accordingly, the mitigating effect of medical cannabis
laws on opioid-related mortality vanishes when I include state-specific time trends in
state-year-level difference-in-differences regressions.
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1 Introduction
The number of opioid overdose deaths in the United States increased from about 9,000 in
2000 to over 42,000 in 2016. Both the level of and the rise in mortality vary substantially
across states. In 2016, West Virginia had the highest opioid overdose mortality rate with 41.8
per 100,000 population whereas Nebraska had the lowest with 2.5 per 100,000. Mortality
growth is even more heterogeneous. Since 1999, mortality rates have risen between 15%
in California and over 2,200% in West Virginia and almost 4,600% in North Dakota. The
continued increase of opioid-related mortality also shows that existing policy responses have
not been successful in containing this so-called opioid epidemic.
A potential reduction in opioid overdose mortality may come from the legalization of
medical cannabis.1 Many opioid users initially obtain the drug as a prescription to treat
pain, for which medical cannabis can be a safer and less addictive substitute. For individuals
who are likely to initiate the use of opioids recreationally, access to cannabis may also provide
an alternative. While cannabis consumption is prohibited by federal law, 29 states and the
District of Columbia have passed medical cannabis laws (MCL). Many of these laws regulate
access to medical cannabis through dispensaries, where certified individuals can purchase the
drug. Bachhuber et al. (2014) and Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) find that medical
cannabis legalization is associated with a 20% to 25% reduction in mortality rates. Moreover,
Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) show that this reduction mostly operates through active
and legal medical cannabis dispensaries.
In this paper, I estimate the effect of medical cannabis legalization on opioid-related
mortality using mortality data from 1999 to 2016. I employ a difference-in-differences (DD)
framework that accounts for heterogeneity in mortality trends across states. Estimates from
a “canonical” DD model that only includes state and year fixed effects imply that MCL and
active and legal dispensaries significantly reduce mortality rates due to opioid overdoses.
I find, however, that this negative effect of medical cannabis legalization on opioid-related
mortality becomes much smaller in absolute value—or even turns positive—and is mostly
statistically insignificant when I include linear or quadratic state-specific time trends in the
DD regressions.
These two sets of estimates indicate that the states that have legalized medical cannabis
exhibit lower pre-existing opioid mortality trends. The standard textbook DD regression
that only includes state and year fixed effects cannot account for such differential trends and
therefore leads to biased estimates. Put differently, the common trends assumption that is
1Throughout this paper, I refer to the psychoactive drug derived from the cannabis plant as cannabis
instead of marijuana due to the racial implications of the latter term.
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necessary for a DD regression to identify the causal effect of a policy appears to be violated
in this setting. States with slower growth in opioid-related mortality are possibly more likely
to implement an MCL because attitudes towards cannabis legalization may be correlated
with the economic conditions, health issues, and supply side factors that have given rise to
the opioid epidemic (see Hollingsworth, Ruhm, and Simon, 2017; Ruhm, 2018). For example,
states that have legalized medical cannabis, such as California and Washington, have much
lower opioid-related mortality rates than West Virginia and some midwestern states, which
are hit hardest by the opioid epidemic and have no MCL. In a DD regression, state fixed
effects can only account for such differences in levels.
In addition, MCL-states also experienced slower growth in opioid-related mortality be-
fore they implemented these laws than non-MCL-states during the same time period. For
example, in states that introduced an MCL in 2013 (Connecticut and Massachusetts), opioid
mortality rates increased 58% between 1999 and 2012 whereas they rose 491% in states that
have not implemented an MCL so far (see Table 2). Importantly, a combination of state and
year fixed effects cannot account for this pattern in a DD framework. Instead, it is necessary
to include state-specific time trends to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of medical
cannabis legalization on opioid-related mortality.
After showing that the common trends assumption is likely violated in this case, I compare
the estimated effects of MCL and medical cannabis dispensaries on opioid-related mortality
based on DD regressions without and with linear and quadratic state-specific time trends.
Not including time trends yields negative and statistically significant coefficients that im-
ply a reduction in mortality rates due to active and legal dispensaries of about 22%. In
contrast, these effects become mostly indistinguishable from zero with state-specific time
trends. Standard errors increase slightly when I include time trends, but, more importantly,
the point estimates are closer to zero than in regressions without trends or even positive.
Specifically, I can rule out negative effects below ´8% with 95% confidence. The results
exhibit heterogeneity across types of opioids and over time, but overall the same pattern
holds.
I find that the mitigating impact of MCL on opioid overdose mortality diminishes over
time. Specifically, if I include post-2013 years in the sample period, the effect of MCL
becomes statistically insignificant regardless of the inclusion of state-specific time trends.
The sample periods used by Bachhuber et al. (2014) and Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson
(2018) end in 2010 and 2013. This finding shows that policies that may have been effective
in the early years of the opioid epidemic are no longer successful in reducing the number
of overdose deaths. Mortality rates have not only grown faster in recent years than in the
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2000s, but the type of opioids most commonly associated with overdose deaths has shifted
from prescription opioids to heroin and more recently to synthetic opioids such as fentanyl.
In this evolving public health crisis, it is therefore crucial to re-evaluate policy responses.
Including state-specific time trends fundamentally alters the implications of this policy
evaluation. Specifically, MCL do not seem to provide a successful avenue to lower opioid
overdose mortality.2 More generally, this finding highlights the importance of assessing the
common trends assumption and—if it is violated—modeling group-specific trends in policy
evaluations that rely on DD regressions.
In addition to MCL, I also consider the effect of other policies, including Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP), Naloxone Access Laws, Good Samaritan Laws, and Pill
Mill Bills, on opioid-related mortality. For most of these policies, I do not find significant
effects when accounting for state trends.
After showing that time trends matter in analyzing the effect of MCL on opioid-related
mortality, I provide a more general discussion of the role of group-specific time trends in
DD regressions. Specifically, I show how policy effects can be biased in the presence of
group-specific time trends when they are not included in a DD regression. To assess the
need for state trends, I then plot residuals from opioid mortality regressions by medical
cannabis’s legal status. This simple visual tool allows me to provide further evidence against
the common trends assumption in this context.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section, I provide insti-
tutional background on the opioid crisis, medical cannabis legalization, and other related
policies and discuss the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the mortality data, policy
variables, and the empirical framework. Section 4 assesses the common trends assumption
and contains the regression results. I discuss the importance of group-specific time trends in
DD regressions and the use of residual plots in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Related Literature
In this section, I provide institutional background on the opioid epidemic, MCL, and other
policies designed to reduce opioid-related mortality. I also discuss the existing literature on
these laws and policies.
2Medical cannabis legalization has other benefits, however. Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013) show
that MCL lower traffic fatalities, for instance, and several studies find a decline in opioid prescriptions due
to MCL (see Section 2.2 for details).
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2.1 Opioid Overdose Mortality
Addiction to opioids and the resulting rising trend in overdose mortality have become a major
public health crisis in the United States. This so-called opioid epidemic, which claimed over
42,000 lives in 2016, has proceeded in three waves.3 Initially, the increase in opioid deaths
was linked to the abuse of prescription opioid analgesics such as OxyContin (oxycodone),
often obtained from so-called pill mills, i.e. clinics that prescribe large quantities of opioids
without medical need, or on the black market. As prescription opioids became more difficult
to obtain, partially as a result of the implementation of PDMP (see below), many users
switched to heroin, especially in the form of black tar heroin smuggled from Mexico. (See
Quinones (2015) for an account of the diffusion of both prescription opioids and black tar
heroin.) As a result, heroin overdose mortality started to rise steeply in 2010. More recently,
synthetic opioids such as fentanyl have become the most common drug involved in overdose
deaths. While fentanyl also plays a medical role as a powerful analgesic, it is increasingly
manufactured and distributed illicitly, which has led to a sharp increase in overdose deaths
starting in 2013. Since the nature and source of the involved drugs differ across these three
waves, there is likely no single policy response that can contain this epidemic. This implies
that policies that have reduced opioid-related mortality in the 2000s and early 2010s may
not be effective any more in this still-evolving crisis. When evaluating existing policies, it
is therefore important to consider the sample period, on which empirical results are based.
I come back to this point when discussing my results below. Specifically, I estimate opioid
mortality regressions for samples starting in 1999 and ending in 2010, 2013, and 2015.
2.2 Medical Cannabis Laws
While still classified as a Schedule I drug, i.e. a drug that has a high potential for abuse and
no accepted role for medical treatment, on the federal level, 29 states and the District of
Columbia have legalized the medical use of cannabis to date. The first state to do so was
California in 1996, and this state was also the first to regulate activities of medical cannabis
dispensaries. Thirteen states had legalized medical cannabis by 2009, but access to the drug
was difficult in practice due to a lack of distributors who feared prosecution under federal
law. This changed with the 2009 Ogden Memorandum establishing that no federal funds
were to be used to prosecute individuals who complied with state laws. Since then, most
states with MCL have permitted the operation of medical cannabis dispensaries. (See Smith
(2017) for a more detailed account of medical cannabis legalization and especially the role of
3See https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html.
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dispensaries.) Legalizing medical cannabis may affect the consumption of other drugs. For
example, Anderson, Hansen, and Rees (2013) estimate the effect of MCL on traffic fatalities,
implying that there is a substitution from alcohol to cannabis consumption when the latter
becomes legal. This effect does not change in magnitude when including state trends but it
loses its statistical significance.
In the context of the opioid epidemic, Bradford and Bradford (2016), Bradford and Brad-
ford (2017), Bradford et al. (2018), and Wen and Hockenberry (2018) show that legalization
of medical cannabis reduces the number of prescriptions filled for opioid analgesics among
Medicare and Medicaid enrollees. It is plausible that individuals who use opioids to treat
pain may switch to medical cannabis when the latter becomes legally available since cannabis
has analgesic properties. Chu (2015) finds that treatment admissions for heroin addiction
are 20% lower in states with MCL. This result is not robust to the inclusion of quadratic
time trends, whether they are state-specific or not. Smith (2017) estimates a similarly sized
decline in opioid-related treatment admissions in core-based statistical areas (CBSA) with
medical cannabis dispensaries.
Two studies have shown that MCL may lower opioid-related mortality. Bachhuber et al.
(2014) use data from 1999 to 2010 and estimate a 25% reduction mortality rates in states
with legalized medical cannabis. Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) extend their sample
period to 2013 and find that an MCL alone lowers mortality rates by 8% to 21% depending on
whether they include states that adopted an MCL after 2010. Importantly, Powell, Pacula,
and Jacobson (2018) show that it is not the MCL per se that is associated with lower
mortality rates, but rather whether a state legally protects medical cannabis dispensaries
and dispensaries are actually operating in the state. Specifically, they estimate that active
and legal dispensaries lower opioid mortality rates by 40% to 43% in the 1999 to 2010 time
period and by about 23% in the 1999 to 2013 time period. They obtain similar results
when adding heroin-related mortality. In contrast, the effect of MCL is not statistically
significant when both MCL and active and legal dispensaries are included in the regression.
The estimated patterns for opioid-related treatment admissions are similar. In determining
the effects of MCL on opioid-related outcomes it is therefore not simply the legal status that
matters but more so whether potential users can access medical cannabis legally through
dispensaries.4 Bachhuber et al. (2014) and Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) employ
state-level DD regressions without time trends.
4Pacula et al. (2015) and Chapman et al. (2016) highlight the importance of accounting for differences
in MCL.
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Smith (2017) and Garin, Pohl, and Smith (2018) use a more granular approach that
emphasizes the role of dispensaries. Garin, Pohl, and Smith (2018) consider states that
eventually legalize medical cannabis and show that counties in these states that had operat-
ing dispensaries experience lower opioid and heroin-related mortality than counties without
dispensaries. Both Smith (2017) and Garin, Pohl, and Smith (2018) include state-specific
time trends in their CBSA- and county-level regressions.
2.3 Other Policies
Most states have addressed the opioid crisis by implementing measures that are aimed at
restricting access to opioids or at alleviating the consequences of their use. Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP) are the primary policy in the first category. Under a
PDMP, physicians and/or pharmacists obtain information on their patients’ previous use of
controlled drugs from a central statewide database before writing or filling a new prescription.
Evidence on the effectiveness of PDMP is mixed. Paulozzi, Kilbourne, and Desai (2011) and
Li et al. (2014) do not find that these programs lower mortality. In contrast, Patrick et al.
(2016), Buchmueller and Carey (2018), Dave, Grecu, and Saffer (2017), Meinhofer (2017),
and Pardo (2017) show that the effectiveness of PDMP depends on their characteristics,
and more robust programs can be successful in reducing opioid-related mortality and drug
abuse. In particular, policies that require providers to use PDMP lower the number of opioid
prescriptions and related mortality.
Another supply-side intervention is the reformulation of OxyContin to make it harder to
abuse. Alpert, Powell, and Pacula (2017) and Evans, Lieber, and Power (2018) show that
the OxyContin reformulation led to lower rates of misuse of this drug but also increased
heroin overdose mortality as OxyContin users substituted towards heroin. In addition, a few
states have passed Pill Mill Bills to reduce access to prescription drugs outside of legitimate
medical providers. Mallatt (2017) finds that these laws can reduce the number of oxycodone
prescriptions.
On the demand side, states have passed Naloxone Access Laws and Good Samaritan Laws
to alleviate the fatal consequences of opioid use. Naloxone Access Laws allow unqualified
individual to administer Naloxone, which counteracts the effects of an opioid overdose. Good
Samaritan Laws give individuals immunity for crimes related to drug possession if they seek
medical care in case of an overdose. Both of these types of laws are therefore designed to
prevent fatal outcomes in the event of a drug overdose. Rees et al. (2017) find that Naloxone
Access Laws and Good Samaritan Laws lowered opioid overdose mortality by about 10%.
These laws do not necessarily reduce consumption of opioids. On the contrary, they could
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increase consumption because they lower the risk of death from overdoses and therefore
implicitly make opioids safer to consume. Accordingly, Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) show
that Naloxone Access Laws led to an increase in opioid-related emergency room visits and
more larger numbers of thefts to finance opioid addiction. Although Naloxone Access Laws
do not affect mortality overall, they find an increase in opioid overdose deaths associated
with Naloxone Access Laws in the Midwest by 14%. Both studies employe DD regressions,
but Rees et al. (2017) do not include time trends whereas Doleac and Mukherjee (2018)
control for linear state-specific time trends. Hence, in the case of Naloxone Access Laws,
controlling for state-specific time trends can change conclusions about the effectiveness of
the policy.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Data Sources
Using the universe of death records from 1999 to 2015 from the CDC’s National Vital Statis-
tics System (NVSS) and population data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End
Results (SEER) Program, I construct mortality rates per 100,000 population on the state
and year level. The NVSS mortality data contain multiple causes of death, which allows
me to identify the type of drug that was involved in a given death. I define opioid over-
doses as deaths due to “Accidental poisoning” (ICD-10 codes X40 to X44), “Intentional
self-poisoning” (X60 to X69), “Assault by drugs, medicaments and biological substances”
(X85), or “Poisoning with undetermined intent” (Y10 to Y14) where heroin (T40.1), other
opioids (T40.2), methadone (T40.3), or other synthetic opioids (T40.4) are listed as a con-
tributing cause of death. “Other opioids” include natural and semisynthetic opioids and in
particular prescription opioids. Since it is often not observable by medical examiners which
specific opioid caused a death and whether it was prescribed or obtained illegally, I combine
the codes T40.2 to T40.4 in the main results and refer to these drugs simply as “opioids.”
I obtain information on relevant state and year level policies from various existing studies
that have collected policy information from original sources.5 To measure legal access to
medical cannabis, I follow the approach proposed by Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) and
differentiate between MCL and whether a state legally protects dispensaries and dispensaries
are actually operating in the state (active and legal dispensaries). I rely on the policy data
collected by these authors for the 1999 to 2013 period (see also Chriqui et al., 2002; Pacula
5I am grateful to these authors for publishing their policy variables.
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et al., 2002; Pacula, Boustead, and Hunt, 2014). For the post-2013 period, I use information
on MCL and dispensary status from Smith (2017). In addition, I use information on state
laws that require the use of PDMP from Meinhofer (2017), on Naloxone Access Laws and
Good Samaritan Laws from Rees et al. (2017), and on Pill Mill Bills from Mallatt (2017).
Control variables includes states’ demographic composition (fraction male, fraction white,
aged 18 to 64, and aged 65 and over), which I obtain from population data from the SEER
Program.6 I also control for state-level unemployment rates derived from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics’s Local Area Unemployment Statistics and states’ beer tax rates obtained
from the Beer Institute’s Brewers Almanac.7
3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows state-year-level summary statistics for opioid-related mortality rates, policy
variables, and demographic covariates by medical cannabis legalization status. For opioids
overall as well as for individual types of opioids and heroin, mortality rates are higher when
an MCL is implemented and even higher when there are active and legal dispensaries. These
differences are unconditional and do not imply a positive effects of medical cannabis legal-
ization on opioid-related mortality. Policies that are intended to alleviate the opioid crisis
are positively correlated with MCL and active and legal dispensaries. This relationship is
partly due to the fact that more states legalized medical cannabis over the sample period
and increasingly implemented PDMP, Naloxone Access Laws, and Good Samaritan Laws.
It also highlights the importance of controlling for the presence of other policies when es-
timating the effect of MCL. In the regressions below, I also control for the beer tax rate,
the unemployment rates, and demographics. These covariates do not differ substantially by
medical cannabis legalization status.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the effect of legalizing medical cannabis on opioid-related mortality, I follow
Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018) and differentiate between MCL per se and whether
a state has active and legal medical cannabis dispensaries. Since actual access to medical
cannabis may be more important than its legal status, it is important to distinguish between
these two levels of medical cannabis’s status in a given state (see also Smith, 2017; Garin,
6See https://seer.cancer.gov/popdata/.
7See https://www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm and http://www.beerinstitute.org/multimedia/brewers-
almanac/.
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Pohl, and Smith, 2018). The baseline DD regression for state-year-level opioid overdose
mortality rates is
logpMRstq “ θn1MCLst ` θn2ALDst `X 1stβn ` αns ` γnt ` unst, (1)
where MRst is the mortality rate per 100,000 population in state s and year t. I consider
four specific mortality rates: due to opioids overall (excluding heroin), prescription opioids,
heroin, and synthetic opioids. The main policy variables are MCLst and ALDst. That is,
in a departure from the “classic” DD regression, there are two binary treatment variables.
MCLst is a dummy variable that equals one if state s has legalized medical cannabis in
year t and zero otherwise. ALDst is an indicator variable that turns on if state s has active
and legal dispensaries in year t. The vector Xst includes indicators for whether the other
policies mentioned above (required PDMP, Naloxone Access Laws, Good Samaritan Laws,
and Pill Mill Bills) are in place as well as additional control variables (the beer tax rate,
unemployment rate, and fraction white, male, aged 18 to 64, and aged 65 and over). Finally,
αns and γ
n
t are state and year fixed effects. The superscript
n stands for “no time trends”
to distinguish the coefficients in regression (1) from the regressions with state-specific time
trends below. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered on the state level.
The coefficients of interest are θn1 and θ
n
2 . They measure the approximate percentage effect
of the implementation of an MCL and of whether a state has active and legal dispensaries
on opioid-related mortality rates. To assess if medical cannabis legalization has an effect on
opioid overdose mortality overall, I test the joint hypothesis
H0 : θ
n
1 “ θn2 “ 0 against H1 : θn1 ‰ 0 or θn2 ‰ 0
and report the p-value from the corresponding F -test.
To allow for different trends in opioid-related mortality across states, I add linear state-
specific time trends µ`st to regression (1):
logpMRstq “ θ`1MCLst ` θ`2ALDst `X 1stβ` ` α`s ` γ`t ` µ`st` u`st. (2)
If the true relationship between medical cannabis legalization and opioid-related mortality is
given by regression (2) instead of regression (1), the time trends would be part of the error
term in regression (1), i.e. unst “ µ`st ` u`st. Omitting time trends would therefore lead to
biased estimates θˆn1 and θˆ
n
2 if the implementation of MCL or active and legal dispensaries is
correlated with state-specific time trends µ`st. This would occur, for instance, if states where
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opioid mortality rates grow relatively slowly are more likely to legalize medical cannabis.
If states do not exhibit differential mortality trends, however, including state-specific time
trends would introduce additional noise, thereby leading to inefficient estimates. (I revisit
the role and consequences of state-specific time trends in Section 5.) The assumption of
linear time trends may be too restrictive since opioid mortality rates have started to grow
at a faster than constant rate in recent years.8 I therefore allow for quadratic time trends in
addition to the linear time trends in regression (2) by adding the term νqs t
2:
logpMRstq “ θq1MCLst ` θq2ALDst `X 1stβq ` αqs ` γqt ` µqst` νqs t2 ` uqst. (3)
To assess whether mortality trends differ across states and therefore make the inclusion of
state-specific time trends necessary, I test the null hypothesis that time trends do not differ
on average between states that have and do not have an MCL. After estimating regression
(2), I test the following hypothesis:
H0 :
1
|S1|
ÿ
sPS1
µ`s “ 1|S0|
ÿ
s1PS0
µ`s1 against H1 :
1
|S1|
ÿ
sPS1
µ`s ‰ 1|S0|
ÿ
s1PS0
µ`s1 , (4)
where S1 “ tstates with an MCL during the sample periodu and S0 “ tstates without an
MCL during the sample periodu. After estimating regression (3), I test hypothesis (4) (with
superscript ` replaced by q) and the following hypothesis:
H0 :
1
|S1|
ÿ
sPS1
νqs “ 1|S0|
ÿ
s1PS0
νqs1 against H1 :
1
|S1|
ÿ
sPS1
νqs ‰ 1|S0|
ÿ
s1PS0
νqs1 . (5)
In addition, I test hypotheses (4) and (5) for states’ dispensary status, i.e. S1 “ tstates with
active and legal dispensaries during the sample periodu and S0 “ tstates without active and
legal dispensaries during the sample periodu. In the regression tables below, I report the p-
values from F -tests of the respective hypotheses. Rejecting the null hypothesis (4) or (5)
implies that states with and without an MCL or active and legal dispensaries exhibit differ-
ent trends in opioid-related mortality. Including state-specific time trends would therefore
be warranted in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of medical cannabis legal-
ization.
8The outcome variable is log-mortality rates, which makes it more likely that linear time trends are
sufficient. However, I can test whether quadratic time trends should be included, see below.
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4 Results
4.1 Assessing the Common Trends Assumption
Before discussing the regression results, I provide descriptive evidence that shows whether the
common trends assumption is violated. In Figure 1, I plot mean mortality rates per 100,000
population for deaths due to opioids, i.e. prescription opioids, methadone, and synthetic
opioids combined, and heroin. I calculate mean mortality rates in each year for three groups
of states: those that never implemented an MCL by 2015, those that had an MCL in place
in a given year, and those that did not have an MCL in a given year but implemented it
by 2015, see Figures 1a and 1c. I also plot the analogue mean mortality rates by whether
states had active and legal dispensaries, implemented them at a later point in time, or never
had them, see Figures 1b and 1d. To assess the common trends assumption, the relevant
comparison is between the states that never implemented an MCL or never had active and
legal dispensaries and states that did so at a later year (“MCL-states before MCL” and
“ALD-states before ALD” on Figure 1’s labels).
Figure 1a shows that mortality rates in states without an MCL and MCL-states before
the law’s implementation trended similarly between 1999 and 2006 but diverged afterwards.
Specifically, the growth in opioid overdose mortality slowed in MCL-states before they im-
plemented the law. The pattern by dispensary status in Figure 1b is similar. Up to 2006,
mortality trends are parallel with states that later implemented their MCL having higher
rates. Starting in 2006, however, the mortality trends diverge. Since the majority of MCL
were implemented after 2006, these diverging mortality trends imply that the common trends
assumption is violated. Put differently, states that introduced an MCL after 2006 (the treat-
ment group) experienced different pre-treatment trends in the outcome of interest than states
that did not have an MCL (the control group). In particular, the introduction of MCL is
associated with lower mortality, which likely introduces selection bias. Controlling for state
and year fixed effects is unlikely to solve this issue because there is not simply a parallel
difference in trends that these two sets of fixed effects would control for. Rather, it is likely
that state-specific time trends are necessary to reduce selection bias.
The trends in heroin-related mortality rates, shown in Figures 1c and 1d, do not exhibit
the same extent of divergence between states that never had MCL or active and legal dis-
pensaries and states with a later MCL or active and legal dispensaries start date. There is
some evidence that heroin mortality rates grow faster in the treatment group at the end of
the sample period, however, especially when classifying states by their dispensary status.
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Next, I compare the opioid overdose mortality growth after 1999 in states that imple-
mented an MCL or had active and legal dispensaries to states that did not. Specifically, I
calculate the percentage change in combined opioid and heroin mortality rates per 100,000
population between 1999 and the year before the first full year that a state had an MCL
or active and legal dispensaries. Table 2 shows the resulting percentage changes by MCL
status. For example, the table indicates that mortality rates in Colorado and Hawaii, which
implemented an MCL in 2001, declined by 1% between 1999 and 2000 on average. During the
same time, states that had never had an MCL by 2015 experienced an increase in mortality
rates by 49%. The same pattern holds for all the remaining years: states that implemented
an MCL saw a lower rise on opioid-related mortality in the years before the MCL came into
effect than states without an MCL during the sample period. The difference can be substan-
tial. Mortality increased by 44% on average in Arizona, the District of Columbia, and New
Jersey between 1999 and 2010, for example, whereas it grew by 492% in never-MCL states.
Table 3 shows a similar pattern for states that had active and legal dispensaries compared
to states that never allowed dispensaries to operate by 2015. Between 1999 and 2013, for
example, mortality rates rose by 233% in the District of Columbia, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, which started having active and
legal dispensaries in 2014, whereas mortality increased by 432% in states that never had
active and legal dispensaries over the same time period. The smaller mortality growth in
states with active and legal dispensaries also holds in all other years. These results clearly
show that states with active and legal dispensaries are negatively selected on pre-existing
mortality trends. Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 provide additional evidence that states
with an MCL or active and legal dispensaries experienced lower mortality rates in the years
leading up to an MCL implementation or start of active and legal dispensaries than states
that did not legalize medical cannabis or dispensaries.
Figure 1 and Tables 2 and 3 show unconditional mean mortality rates and their changes
that do not control for state and year fixed effects or other covariates. Nevertheless, this
evidence suggests that the common trends assumption underlying a standard DD analysis
is likely violated in this case. In Section 5.2, I provide further evidence against the common
trends assumption conditional on state and year fixed effects and covariates.
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4.2 Impact of Medical Cannabis Legalization on Opioid- and Heroin-
Related Mortality
For each mortality outcome, I estimate regressions for the time periods 1999 to 2010, 1999
to 2013, and 1999 to 2016. The first time period corresponds to the first wave of the opioid
crisis that mostly involved prescription opioids, the second set of regressions adds the years
during which heroin emerged as the main driver of opioid-related mortality, and the 1999 to
2015 time period also captures the recent increase in mortality due to synthetic opioids. For
each of these three time periods, I estimate regression (1) without time trends, regression
(2) with linear state-specific time trends, and regression (3) with quadratic time trends.
First, I consider the effect of MCL and active and legal dispensaries on the log-mortality
rate per 100,000 population due to opioids, which include prescription opioids, methadone,
and synthetic opioids, and heroin combined. Table 4 shows the regression results. Starting
with the 1999 to 2010 period and no time trends, column (1) shows a coefficient of ´0.170,
which corresponds to a decline in opioid-related mortality by 16% when an MCL is in effect.
The coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels. This effect is similar
to the corresponding estimate in Powell, Pacula, and Jacobson (2018). In addition, active
and legal dispensaries reduce opioid mortality rates by an additional 19%, and this estimate
is significant at the 5% level. These estimates confirm the results in Powell, Pacula, and
Jacobson (2018), i.e. it is not primarily the implementation of an MCL that lowers opioid-
related mortality, but it is more important whether a state has legalized medical cannabis
dispensaries and they are operational.
Adding linear state-specific time trends slightly lowers the point estimate for the effect of
MCL, see column (2). When adding quadratic state trends in column (3), the effect of MCL
on opioid-related mortality rates equals ´0.5% and is not significant at conventional levels,
i.e. the negative effect of MCL on opioid overdose mortality disappears. The estimated effect
of active and legal dispensaries also substantially changes when I include linear or quadratic
state trends. The point estimate is reduced to about half and the effect loses its statistical
significance. When adding linear and quadratic time trends, the MCL and dispensary status
indicators are not jointly statistically significant, with p-values for the associated F -tests of
0.20 and 0.47. In other words, when allowing for state-specific time trends, I cannot reject the
null hypothesis that MCL and dispensary status have no effect on opioid-related mortality.
This conclusion contrasts with the estimates that do not account for state trends in column
(1) and which point to a strong mortality-reducing effect of medical cannabis legalization
that operates through active and legal dispensaries.
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Next, I revisit the role of state-specific time trends when the sample period is extended
to 2013 or 2016. Due to the changing nature of the opioid crisis, these results are important
in their own right. In the 1999 to 2013 sample without time trends, the effect of MCL is
attenuated and the effect of active and legal dispensaries is slightly larger in absolute value
compared to the 1999 to 2010 sample, see column (4) in Table 4. When testing the joint
effect of MCL and active and legal dispensaries, the resulting p-value equals 0.03. Once I add
linear or quadratic state trends, MCL and dispensary status have no statistically significant
negative effect on opioid-related mortality and the effect of active and legal dispensaries even
becomes positive and significant at the 10% level. The p-values for testing the joint effect of
MCL and active and legal dispensaries in the regressions in column (5) and (6) equal 0.20
and 0.95.
When further extending the sample to 2016, the estimated coefficients are similar to the
shorter sample periods. Active and legal dispensaries only have a significantly negative effect
when I do not include state-specific time trends. Moreover, with linear or quadratic time
trends, MCL and dispensary status are not jointly significant with p-values of 0.28, and 0.32
in the regressions in columns (8) and (9). For almost all sample periods and specifications
with time trends, I reject the null hypotheses that linear and quadratic trends are identical
across states with and without MCL or active and legal dispensaries, see the last four rows
in Table 4. This suggests that accounting for state-specific time trends is indeed necessary
when modeling opioid-related mortality rates.
4.3 Impact of MCL and Dispensary Status on Mortality Related
to Specific Types of Opioids and Heroin
After analyzing the impact of MCL and active and legal dispensaries on opioid- and heroin-
related mortality overall, I consider effects on mortality related to prescription opioids,
heroin, and synthetic opioids separately in this section. The regression results for prescrip-
tion opioids are shown in Table 5, which follows the same structure as Table 4. For the 1999
to 2010 period, when prescription drugs were the main driver of the opioid crisis, the overall
patterns are similar to those in Table 4, but the effects of MCL and active and legal dispen-
saries are larger in absolute value. Without including state trends, MCL reduce mortality
due to prescription opioids by 31% and active and legal dispensaries lower mortality rates
by an additional 37%, see column (1). These effects are significant at the 1% level.
As with opioids overall, the significantly negative effect of active and legal dispensaries
disappears in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 when I control for state trends. The effect of
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MCL does not change when I add only linear trends but is cut by two thirds and loses its
statistical significance when I introduce quadratic time trends. Hence, the mitigating effect
of medical cannabis legalization on mortality due to prescription opioids is more robust than
for opioids overall, but accounting for differential state trends nevertheless affects the results.
When I extend the sample to 2013 or 2016, the patterns are similar but attenuated
compared to the 1999 to 2010 sample period. MCL and active legal dispensaries lower
prescription opioid mortality by 21% and 28% during the 1999 to 2013 period when I do not
include time trends, see column (4) in Table 5. These effects become closer to zero or positive
and statistically insignificant when I add linear or quadratic state-specific time trends in the
regressions in columns (5) and (6). For the 1999 to 2016 sample, MCL and active and legal
dispensaries have no statistically significant effects regardless of whether I time trends. The
last four rows in Table 5 show that state-specific time trends should be included in these
regressions since I strongly reject the null hypotheses that linear and quadratic trends are
the same across states with and without MCL or active and legal dispensaries.
Next, I consider the effects of MCL and dispensaries on mortality due to heroin overdoses.
Starting with the 1999 to 2010 period during which heroin played a less important role than
prescription opioids, I find that legalizing medical cannabis and dispensaries has a strong
negative effect on heroin-related mortality. Specifically, MCL reduce mortality rates by 71%
and active and legal dispensaries lower it by another 49% when I do not control for time
trends, see column (1) in Table 6, and these effects are statistically significant at the 1%
level. When I add linear or quadratic state-specific time trends in the regressions in columns
(2) and (3), the effects become smaller in absolute value. The effects of MCL are now only
significant at the 10% level and dispensary effects are insignificant at conventional levels.
These results suggest that MCL mitigated the part of the opioid crisis that was related to
heroin in the 1999 to 2010 period and this effect is relatively robust to the inclusion on state
trends. In contrast, dispensary status does not play a significant role for heroin overdose
mortality once differential trends in this outcome variable across states are accounted for.
MCL and dispensary status are jointly significant only in specifications without time trends.
Heroin overdoses played a more important role after 2010, so considering the 1999 to
2013/2016 samples is particularly relevant here. The mortality-reducing effect of MCL be-
comes smaller in these samples compared to the 1999 to 2010 period. For the 1999 to 2013
sample, the effect equals ´54% and is significant at the 5% level, see column (4) in Table
6, but for the 1999 to 2016 sample it becomes insignificant, see column (7). When I add
linear or quadratic time trends, the effects become smaller in absolute value. Depending
on the sample period, they range between 25% and 47% and are significant at most at the
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10% level, see columns (5), (6), (8), and (9). Hence, in contrast to opioids, the mitigating
effects of MCL on heroin overdose mortality are more pronounced even in the longer sample
periods and more robust to including state-specific time trends. Nevertheless, the point es-
timates increase towards zero when I account for state trends, although the differences are
not statistically significant. Active and legal dispensaries only significantly reduce mortality
in the 1999 to 2016 sample, by 38%, if no time trends are included. In the other specifica-
tions, dispensary status does not have a statistically significant effect. This finding suggests
that MCL play a more important role in reducing heroin-related mortality than dispensary
status. As in the 1999 to 2010 sample, MCL and dispensary status are jointly significant
only in specifications without time trends.
Testing the null hypotheses of equal linear and quadratic time trends across states with
and without MCL or active and legal dispensaries shows that including linear state-specific
time trends is likely sufficient in the case of heroin-related mortality, see the last four rows
in Table 6. Specifically, I cannot reject the null hypotheses that quadratic and linear terms
are equal in the specifications with quadratic time trends. Moreover, the linear terms are
only significantly different in the 1999 to 2013 and for dispensary status in the 1999 to 2016
sample.
Finally, I estimate the effect of MCL and dispensaries on mortality due to synthetic
opioids. Since this type of drug only started to play an important role in the opioid crisis in
recent years, I focus on the 1999 to 2016 sample period here. Table 7 shows the regression
results. In contrast to the other drugs, the effects of MCL and active and legal dispensaries on
synthetic opioid overdose mortality are mostly not significantly negative with one exception,
independent of the sample period and whether I include time trends. The regression results
rule out any alleviating effect of medical cannabis legalization on mortality due to synthetic
opioid overdoses. Similarly to the results on heroin-related mortality, I cannot reject the null
hypotheses that linear and quadratic time trends are equal across states in the specification
with quadratic trends in the sample periods until 2010 and 2013. There is strong evidence
that linear time trends differ across states with and without MCL and active and legal
dispensaries in the 1999 to 2013 sample and should therefore be included in regressions of
overdose mortality related to synthetic opioids (see the last four rows in Table 7). For the
1999 to 2010 and the 1999 to 2016 samples, the evidence is more mixed.
4.4 Effects of Other Policies
While the main focus of this paper is on the impact of MCL, the analysis discussed above
also serves as a suitable framework to study the effect of policies that are explicitly aimed
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at alleviating the opioid crisis. Here, I consider the impact of PDMP that medical providers
are required to use, Naloxone Access Laws, Good Samaritan Laws, and Pill Mill Bills.9
Required PDMD have no statistically significant effect on mortality due to opioids and
heroin combined and due to prescription or synthetic opioids, regardless of the sample period
and whether I include time trends, see Tables 4, 5, and 7. These programs have a strong
negative effect on heroin-related mortality, however, at least for the 1999 to 2010 sample
independent of the inclusion of time trends. Specifically, mortality rates decline 57% to 62%,
and these effects are significant at the 1% level. These effects disappear in the sample periods
that include post-2010 years.
Naloxone Access Laws reduce opioid-related mortality rates by 33% in the 1999 to 2010
sample when no time trends are included, see column (1) in Table 4, but the estimate
becomes positive when I include linear or quadratic state-specific time trends. There are
similar patterns for the 1999 to 2013 sample period and for mortality related to prescription
opioids (Table 5) and heroin (Table 6). Generally, Naloxone Access Laws have a sizable
negative effect without controlling for state trends, but once linear state trends are included,
these laws are associated with a rise in mortality rates. This increase can be substantial, for
example for mortality related to heroin and synthetic opioids in the 1999 to 2013 sample,
see column (5) in Table 6 and column (6) in Table 7. These findings are consistent with the
existing literature on Naloxone Access Laws. Rees et al. (2017) do not include state trends
and estimate negative effects whereas Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) control for linear state
trends and find no effect overall but an increase in opioid mortality in the Midwest. The
effects of Naloxone Access Laws on opioid- and heroin-related mortality therefore provide
another case for why time trends matter when evaluating state-level policies.
The effects of Good Samaritan Laws follow a similar pattern to those of Naloxone Access
Laws. In particular, these laws reduce opioid mortality by about 29% in the 1999 to 2010
sample when no time trends are added, see column (1) in Table 4, but this effect becomes
positive with linear state trends (`56%, see column (2)) and loses its statistical significance
with quadratic time trends, column (3). When I extend the sample period to 2013 or 2016,
Good Samaritan Laws lower opioid-related mortality in the specification with quadratic
state trends, but these effects are not statistically significant, see columns (6) and (9). For
prescription opioid mortality in Table 5, the effects of Good Samaritan Laws are similar. In
addition, these laws are associated with a substantial increase in heroin-related mortality, at
9There are several papers studying the effects of these policies, see Section 2.3, so I focus on how adding
state-specific time trends affects the results.
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least in the 1999 to 2013 sample when quadratic time trends are included, see column (6) in
Table 6.
Finally, Pill Mill Bills have a large negative and statistically significant effect on mortality
related to opioids and heroin, and prescription and synthetic opioids in the 1999 to 2010
sample when no time trends are included, see column (1) in Tables 4, 5, and 7. These effects
range between ´20% and ´48%. The effect on heroin-related mortality equals `51% and is
statistically significant, see column (1) in Table 6. In specifications with linear or quadratic
trends and when the sample period is extended to 2013 or 2016, the impact of Pill Mill
Bills loses its statistical significance with some point estimates being positive. Hence, the
conclusions about the impact of these bills are similar to those regarding MCL. They seem to
have alleviated the opioid crisis during its first wave until 2010, but the mortality-reducing
effect disappears in later years and when accounting for differences in opioid mortality trends
across states.
5 The Role of State-Specific Time Trends
In this section, I discuss the role of time trends in DD regressions in more general terms. I
also propose a simple visual test for the presence of group-specific time trends and apply it
in the context of medical cannabis legalization and opioid-related mortality.
5.1 Theory
I start with the usual DD regression for state-year-level data that countless economic studies
have employed to evaluate various state-level policies. To focus on the main points, I use
a simplified version of regression (1) without the indicator variable for active and legal
dispensaries, without additional covariates, and with Yst “ logpMRstq:
Yst “ θMCLst ` αs ` γt ` ust. (6)
To estimate the causal effect of MCL on opioid-related mortality, θ, the usual assumption is
that
ErYst|s, ts “ θMCLst ` αs ` γt,
which is equivalent to Erust|s, ts “ 0. That is, conditional on state and year, the error term in
regression (6) has mean zero (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This assumption is known
as the common trends assumption. In this context, it implies that opioid overdose mortality
19
rates cannot follow a different trend over time in states that did and did not implement an
MCL. In other words, in the absence of the implementation of MCL the mortality trends in
both groups of states would have been parallel.
If the common trends assumption holds, the causal effect θ can be estimated via the DD
estimator as follows. In the two states and two time periods case, for example (see Card and
Krueger, 1994), if state s1 implemented the MCL in year t1 whereas no MCL was effective at
any time in state s0 and in year t0 in state s1, θ would be given by the following expression:
ErYs1t1 |s1, t1s ´ ErYs1t0 |s1, t0s ´ pErYs0t1 |s0, t1s ´ ErYs0t0 |s0, t0sq “ θ.
In practice, the data contain multiple states with and without MCL, and the laws are
implemented at different time periods in each state. In this case, a regression-based DD
estimator averages over all state-year comparisons.
Instead of regression (6), it is plausible that the true relationship between MCL and
opioid-related mortality is given by
Yst “ θMCLst ` αs ` γt ` µst` st, (7)
where µst is a linear state-specific time trend and Erst|s, ts “ 0. In contrast to regression
(6), which assumes that the time effects γt are identical across states, regression (7) allows
for systematic differences between states in how opioid mortality rates evolve over time. As
a consequence, if the µs differ across states the common trends assumption is violated. This
is of particular concern if µs1 ‰ µs0 , i.e. if opioid-related mortality in states with an MCL
follows a different trend than in non-MCL states. Since the opioid crisis affects some states
more than others (see Section 4.1), it is likely that regression (7) is a better representation
of the underlying data generating process than regression (6).
When state-specific time trends are present in the true relationship between MCL and
opioid overdose mortality but one estimates regression (6), the expected value of the treat-
ment effect, would be given by
ErYs1t1 |s1, t1s ´ ErYs1t0 |s1, t0s ´ pErYs0t1 |s0, t1s ´ ErYs0t0 |s0, t0sq “ θ ` pµs1 ´ µs0qpt1 ´ t0q.
If the time trends in both states are identical, i.e. if the common trends assumption is
satisfied, this expression reduces to θ and the DD estimator recovers the true causal effect.10
10Note that the DD regression (7) is not identified in the two-period case. The data in the application
span at least 12 years, so this is not a practical concern in this case.
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In contrast, this is not the case if the state-specific time trends differ. For example, if
mortality grows more slowly in the state that implemented an MCL, i.e. µs1 ă µs0 ,
θ ` pµs1 ´ µs0qpt1 ´ t0q ă θ.
In other words, when estimating regression (6) although the true relationship between MCL
and mortality rates is given by equation (7) and opioid-related mortality in states that
implemented MCL grows more slowly, the estimated coefficient of interest is downward
biased. This constitutes a form of selection bias in the sense that states that implemented
an MCL are selected based on lower pre-existing mortality trends.
Put differently, if regression (6) reflects the true relationship between MCL and opioid
mortality rates, the error term in regression (6) has mean zero conditional on state and year:
Erust|s, ts “ 0. In contrast, if regression (7) reflects the true relationship and one estimates
regression (6), the error term has a conditional mean different from zero:
Erust|s, ts “ Erst ` µst|s, ts “ ErYst ´ θMCLst ´ αs ´ γts “ µst.
I use the fact that the error terms contain information on whether regression (6) or (7) denotes
the true relationship between MCL and opioid mortality rates to implement an informal and
visual specification test as follows. After estimating regression (6), the residuals
uˆnst “ Yst ´X 1stβˆn ´ αˆns ´ γˆnt (8)
should not exhibit a differential trend for any state regardless of the states’ MCL status if
the assumption Erust|s, ts “ 0 is correct.11 Specifically, the residuals for MCL-states before
they implemented the law should not trend differently from states that never had an MCL
over the same time period. The same applies for states with and without active and legal
dispensaries. On the contrary, if regression (7) reflects the true relationship, the residuals
may exhibit different trends. Moreover, MCL-states would show a lower trend than non-
MCL-states if µs1 ă µs0 on average, where s1 indexes states that implemented an MCL
during the sample period and s0 those that did not. Note that the residuals in equation
(8) do not include the term θˆMCLst because I am interested in the residual trends in the
absence of the treatment.
To assess the common trends assumption and to determine whether regression (6) or (7)
more likely represents the true relationship between MCL and opioid mortality, I plot the
11Here, I add back the covariates Xst to show the exact form of the residuals discussed in Section 5.2.
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residuals in equation (8) over time and separately for states that have not legalized medical
cannabis, those that have implemented an MCL, and those with active and legal dispensaries
at some point during the sample period. I then assess whether the residuals that correspond
to state-year observations without an MCL or active and legal dispensaries between the three
categories of states. In other words, I check whether pre-existing trends in opioid mortality
residuals differ by medical cannabis’s legal status. If the residuals do not show different
trends, regression (6) is likely an accurate representation of the true relationship. However,
if the residuals for MCL-states or states with active and legal dispensaries exhibit different
pre-trends from states that did not legalize medical cannabis, the common trends assumption
is possibly violated. When I include linear and quadratic state-specific time trends in the
regression and plot the resulting residuals
uˆ`st “ Yst ´X 1stβˆ` ´ αˆ`s ´ γˆ`t ´ µˆ`st, (9)
and
uˆqst “ Yst ´X 1stβˆq ´ αˆqs ´ γˆqt ´ µˆqst´ νˆqs t2, (10)
a previously visible trend should disappear if regression (7) or a regression that also con-
tains quadratic state-specific time trends represent the true relationship between MCL and
mortality. A visual inspection of the residuals from regressions with and without (linear
or quadratic) state-specific time trends can therefore be informative about (i) the potential
selection bias in the regression without trends and (ii) whether adding state trends reduces
this bias.
Comparing pre-trends of the outcome variable conditional on group and time between
treatment and control group—i.e. of the residuals—is more informative in this context than
the ubiquitous plot of unconditional pre-trends to check whether the common trends as-
sumption is satisfied. After all, the common trends assumption underlying DD regressions
is about the conditional mean of the error term Erust|s, ts “ 0 and not the unconditional
mean Erusts “ 0.
5.2 Application
Next, I illustrate the use of the residual plots in the context of the regressions discussed
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. For opioids and heroin combined, Figures 2a, 2d, and 2g plot the
residuals in equation (8), Figures 2b, 2e, and 2h plot the residuals in equation (9), and Figures
2c, 2f, and 2i plot the residuals in equation (10) separately for states that never legalized
medical cannabis by the end of the respective sample period, those that implemented an MCL
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but never had active and legal dispensaries, and finally the states that had active and legal
dispensaries during the sample period. I distinguish between residuals that correspond to
state-year observations without an MCL or active and legal dispensaries (denoted by ˝) and
those when either an MCL was in place or a state had active and legal dispensaries (denoted
by `). To aid the comparison, I indicate the best linear fit for the residuals without MCL
or active and legal dispensaries since they correspond to the relevant mortality pre-trends.
I plot the residuals from regressions of opioid and heroin related mortality rates (see Table
4) for the 1999 to 2010 sample period in the top row of Figure 2. While the residuals for
non-MCL states and for states with an MCL but without dispensaries are centered around
zero and do not exhibit a substantial trend, the residuals for the two states that had active
and legal dispensaries by 2010 (California and New Mexico) show a downward sloping trend
when no time trends are added in the underlying regression, see Figure 2a. That is, in the
notation of Section 5.1, µ1 ă µ0.12 When linear or quadratic time trends are added, the
residuals cease to exhibit a trend and are instead centered around zero, as shown in Figures
2b and 2c.
These residual plots highlight the importance of accounting for potential differences in
pre-existing opioid and heroin mortality trends across states when estimating the impact of
MCL and dispensary status (and possibly other policies). In this case, states that allowed
medical cannabis dispensaries to operate exhibited a declining trend in opioid- and heroin-
related mortality compared to states without active and legal dispensaries (conditional on
state and year fixed effects and time-varying covariates). Therefore, not controlling for state-
specific time trends biases the estimated effect of dispensary status, in this case downward.
Once these differential trends are accounted for via linear or quadratic state-specific time
trends, the bias vanishes as indicated by the horizontal fit lines in Figures 2b and 2c. The
regression results in columns (1) to (3) in Table 4 also reflect these findings since the effects
of MCL and active and legal dispensaries increase (i.e. become smaller in absolute value)
when state trends are added. The residual plots in Figure 2 therefore provide a simple visual
tool to assess differences in outcome trends across groups and to check that these differences
disappear when group-specific trends are included in the regression.
The residual plots in Figures 2d and 2g show that the residuals from opioid-related
mortality regressions without state-specific time trends also exhibit a downward trend for
states with active and legal dispensaries when the sample period is extended to 2013 or
2016. In contrast, states with an MCL that did not have active and legal dispensaries
12Clearly, basing this conclusion on two states is a stretch, but the result is the same when expanding the
sample period to 2013 and 2016, thereby adding more states with active and legal dispensaries (see below).
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exhibit an upward trend in opioid and heroin mortality residuals in the 1999 to 2016 sample.
Once linear or quadratic state trends are included in Figures 2e, 2f, 2h, and 2i, however,
these trends mostly disappear and the residuals are centered around zero. differences in the
point estimates in columns (4) to (9) of Table 4 are consistent with these residual plots. In
particular, the downward trend of residuals in states with active and legal dispensaries points
to a downward bias in the regression coefficients in columns (4) and (7), i.e. in the regressions
that do not include time trends. Indeed, the point estimates for both the dispensary status
and the MCL effects are smaller in these two regressions than in the regressions in columns
(5) or (6) and (8) or (9). Once this bias is removed, the impact of MCL and active and
legal dispensaries on opioid- and heroin-related mortality increases towards zero or becomes
positive.
For regressions of prescription opioid mortality, Figure 3a, which plots the residuals from
regressions without time trends for the 1999 to 2010 sample, shows a downward trend among
states that allowed dispensaries to operate by 2010, thereby pointing to possible downward
bias for the dispensary status coefficient. The downward trend in the mortality residuals
disappears when I add linear or quadratic state-specific time trends, see Figures 3b and 3c.
The residual plots in the bottom two rows of Figure 3 confirm the notion that the MCL and
dispensary effects in the regressions in columns (4) and (7) of Table 5 are downward biased
since prescription opioid mortality residuals exhibit a downward trend in states with active
and legal dispensaries, see Figures 3d and 3g. In contrast, when I add linear or quadratic
state trends, the residuals have no trend and are centered around zero, see Figures 3e, 3f,
3h, and 3i.
For regressions of heroin-related mortality, the residual plots in the top row of Figure 4
also indicate that the estimated MCL and dispensary effects may be subject to downward
bias if state trends are not included. Especially, the residuals for states with an MCL but
without active and legal dispensaries exhibit a strong downward sloping trend in Figure 4a,
indicating that the MCL coefficient in column (1) of Table 6 overstates (in absolute value)
the true mitigating effect of MCL on heroin overdose mortality. The fact that the residuals’
downward trend disappears with linear or quadratic state trends, see Figures 4b and 4c,
suggests that the coefficients in columns (2) and (3) are closer to the true effect.
The residual plots for heroin are less conclusive than for opioids. Without state trends,
residuals for states with an MCL but without active and legal dispensaries exhibit a down-
ward or upward trend depending on the sample period, see Figures 4d and 4g. Moreover, the
residuals for states with and MCL but without active and legal dispensaries trend upward in
the 1999 to 2016 sample. When linear or quadratic time trends are added, the trends do not
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disappear entirely but become smaller and more similar across groups of states. Comparing
Figures 4g, 4h, and 4i shows that including linear or quadratic state-specific time trends
reduces differences in residual trends across treatment groups and thereby potential lowers
the bias in the corresponding treatment effect estimates.
Figure 5 shows that the residuals from regressions of synthetic opioid mortality also follow
slightly different patterns than for the other types of opioids. When no time trends are added,
they follow an upward trend in states with MCL but without active and legal dispensaries
whereas the trend is downward sloping in states with active and legal dispensaries, see Figures
5a and 5d. With linear or quadratic state trends, the residuals’ trend becomes completely
flat only for states without MCL. In the case of synthetic opioids, it is not clear from these
residual plots how omitting state-specific time trends biases the MCL and active and legal
dispensaries coefficients. However, most estimates for the effects of MCL and dispensary
status in Table 7 are not statistically significant.
Overall, the residual plots in Figures 2 to 5 demonstrate how a visual inspection of
residual trends can inform researchers about which of the underlying regression results is
likely biased due to a violation of the common trends assumption.
6 Conclusion
I estimate the impact of MCL and active and legal medical cannabis dispensaries and find
that it is sensitive to the inclusion of state-specific time trends. This finding implies that the
common trends assumption that is necessary for DD regressions to deliver unbiased estimates
is violated. The estimated effects also vary with the sample period. As more recent years are
added, the impact of MCL generally diminishes, suggesting that they may have worked in
reducing opioid-related mortality in the early years of the opioid crisis but to a lesser extent
as the crisis has become more severe in recent years. Hence, MCL may not be as successful
in alleviating the opioid crisis as previously found. While medical cannabis legalization
may not achieve a reduction in opioid-related mortality on the state level, Garin, Pohl, and
Smith (2018) find that counties where a dispensary operates experience significantly lower
mortality rates compared to counties where medical cannabis is legal but no dispensary
exists. In addition, my results imply that other policies intended to mitigate the opioid
crisis are mostly ineffective.
These findings highlight the importance of carefully modeling group-specific time effects
in DD analyses. The common assumption of equal time trends across groups that underlies
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the use of time fixed effects is likely violated in many settings and at a minimum should be
tested, for example by using residual plots as a simple visual tool.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Medical Cannabis Legalization Status
(1) (2) (3)
No MCL/ALD MCL ALD
Opioid and Heroin Mortality Rate 5.607 8.537 11.08
(4.724) (5.196) (6.110)
Prescription Opioid Mortality Rate 2.936 3.882 4.910
(2.955) (2.292) (2.429)
Heroin Mortality Rate 1.133 2.035 3.957
(1.632) (2.245) (3.297)
Synthetic Opioid Mortality Rate 1.106 1.848 3.224
(1.727) (3.801) (4.313)
Required PDMP 0.0363 0.0727 0.0462
(0.187) (0.260) (0.211)
Naloxone Access Law 0.0640 0.139 0.662
(0.245) (0.347) (0.477)
Good Samaritan Law 0.0320 0.139 0.446
(0.176) (0.347) (0.501)
Pill Mill Bill 0.0654 0 0
(0.247) (0) (0)
Beer Tax Rate 0.255 0.342 0.203
(0.206) (0.330) (0.104)
Unemployment Rate 5.485 6.428 6.369
(1.859) (2.304) (1.859)
Fraction Male 0.491 0.497 0.494
(0.00701) (0.0104) (0.00651)
Fraction White 0.821 0.785 0.822
(0.118) (0.203) (0.107)
Fraction Aged 20 to 64 0.608 0.623 0.615
(0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0215)
Fraction Aged 65 and Over 0.133 0.130 0.146
(0.0176) (0.0257) (0.0232)
Observations 688 165 65
Notes: The table shows means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Mortality Rates are per
100,000 population. “No MCL/ALD” refers to state-year observations without any medical cannabis
legalization and “MCL” and “ALD” refers to observations with a medical cannabis law and active and
legal dispensaries, respectively.
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Table 2: Change in Opioid and Heroin Overdose Mortality Rates Since 1999 for States With
and Without Medical Cannbis Laws (MCL), by Year of MCL Introduction
Year t States With Change in Mortality Between 1999 and t´ 1
New MCL New-MCL States Never-MCL States
2000 AK, ME 0% 0%
2001 CO, HI ´1% 49%
2002 NV 14% 116%
2005 MT, VT 156% 254%
2006 RI 230% 253%
2008 NM 32% 393%
2009 MI 366% 474%
2011 AZ, DC, NJ 44% 492%
2012 DE 207% 483%
2013 CT, MA 58% 491%
2014 IL, NH 182% 524%
2015 MD, MN, NY 187% 673%
Notes: Mortality rates include deaths related to all opioids and heroin. Percentage changes are calcu-
lated between 1999 and the year before the year indicated in the first column. “New-MCL States” are
the states given in the second column that had an MCL for a full year for the first time in the given year.
“Never-MCL States” are all remaining states: AL, AR, FL, GA, ID, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, MS, MO, NE,
NC, ND, OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV, WI, and WY. CA, OR, and WA introduced an
MCL before 2000.
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Table 3: Change in Opioid and Heroin Overdose Mortality Rates Since 1999 for States With
and Without Active and Legal Dispensaries (ALD), by Year of ALD Implementation
Year t States With Change in Mortality Between 1999 and t´ 1
New ALD New-ALD States Never-ALD States
2004 CA ´9% 145%
2010 NM 1% 364%
2011 CO 61% 397%
2012 ME 183% 397%
2013 AZ, NJ 72% 401%
2014 DC, MI, MT, NV, 233% 432%
OR, RI, VT, WA
2015 CT 217% 557%
Notes: Mortality rates include deaths related to all opioids and heroin. Percentage changes are calcu-
lated between 1999 and the year before the year indicated in the first column. “New-ALD States” are
the states given in the second column that had active and legal medical cannabis dispensaries for a full
year for the first time in the given year. “Never-ALD States” are all remaining states: AL, AK, AR,
DE, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, MD, MA, MN, MS, MO, NE, NH, NY, NC, ND, OH,
OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WV, WI, and WY.
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